Post by Tutti Frutti on Sept 15, 2006 6:32:31 GMT 2
Assad allows attack, offer "protection" and aim at confusion
By Walid Phares
September 13, 2006
According to well informed Syrian sources, today's Terrorist attack against the US embassy in Damascus is one of the "Machiavellian" Assad operations. Let's remind ourselves that the Syrian regime's senior strategists and intelligence officers were trained by the sophisticated "intox" schools of the former Soviet's KGB. One of the main tactics of this old school, refined by Hafez Assad during his rule of Syria is based on the following concept: If the equation is to your disadvantage, create a new problem, offer to solve it, obtain recognition; and by that you'd change the equation.
The strategic objective of the Assad regime today is to deter Washington from further pressures against Syria , in the form of the Hariri investigation, the US pressure through the Security Council to deploy forces along the borders with Lebanon and the American ongoing support to the anti-Syrian Government in Beirut . Tehran-Damascus-Hezbollah axis is in dire need to "contain" Washington 's pressures and gain time, as much possible of time. Why would they need time? Because they have to rearm Hezbollah, crumble the Lebanese Government, and face off with UN pressures on the nuclear. Syria has the marching orders to disorient the United States , and hence it adopted a twin approach:
a. "Allow" a Jihadist-type terror attack to take place against a US interest in Damascus . And how can that be possible? The seasoned experts on Syria knows all too well that the Assad Mukhabarat are in control of, or have "access" to the overwhelming Terrorist organizations in Syria and Lebanon. They've had thirty years of deep involvement to accomplish this take over. In addition to Shiia Hezbollah , Syria has a control, a remote-control of, or an access to Sunni Salafists groups, including networks that connects with al Qaeda. In short, Syria 's intelligence services can prepare the ground to "persuade" Jihadists to strike at some point. The Jihadists have an ideological and strategic enmity with the US ; the Assad regime has the ability to have the "mob" unleash attacks, in the same way the Baath regime of Syria has "allowed" thousands of Jihadists to cross the border to Iraq to kill US and coalition troops. Assad the father also "allowed" Jihadis to attack U.S and French interests in Lebanon during the 1980s. More recently, Assad "allowed' violent demonstrations to attack embassies in Damascus . Knowing that Syria 's State police controls the country with an iron hand, these precedents are too bright to ignore. In today's apparatus two men dominate the Terror web from their security intelligence positions: Mohammed Nassif, the director of State Security and Ali Yunis, the assistant of Asaf Shawkat, the regime's security commander. Nassif and Yunis are the team that controls and connects with the Jihadist underworld in the Levant .
b. Stage the "protection" : After the operation happens, the regime allows some of their men to be killed in action against the "Terrorists." Obviously, this move will be hard to absorb by Western and American public psychologically. Maybe Hollywood movies writers can. In short (as an analytical projection) the regime "allowed" the operation to happen, "knew" it would happen, and let the security guards on the ground sacrifice themselves in the line of diplomatic duty.
The Dividends:
1. Sending a message to the U.S as follow: al Qaeda can strike you in our midst ( Syria and Lebanon ) and we can't do much about, except the classical protection once the "cells" would be about to engage or have already engaged. In short we are extending the measures under international laws, not more.
2. "But, can stop them." Meaning that our "powerful" intelligence and security agencies can go after these Terrorists (who aren't Syria's friends to start with) and "offer them to you," as we used to do in the good old days: We'd send Hezbollah to kill your Marines in Lebanon and allow the Salafists to kill the Marines again in Iraq, but at the same time we can do business with you and "protect your" embassies from the Terrorists we are harboring anyway. Yes a good Levantine maze.
3. Your public, via international media, "saw" that we are defending your embassy and have "lost" security guards while defending it. So what are you going to tell your public? That we, the Syrian regime, "are" the terrorists? It will look bad when after we sacrificed our men for your diplomats, your diplomats would call us Terrorists.
4. Secretary Rice "had" to issue a statement to "thanking" Syria . In Assad's mind, it would be an embarrassment for the U.S to attack Syria for being a harbor to Terrorism when Damascus has just being thanked for fighting those Terrorists. This, basically, would gain some more "time" for Assad. Enough time needed to:
5. Rearm Hezbollah, prepare attacks against UN and other multinational forces to come closer to the Syrian borders, and of course to allow the other pressures to recede.
6. Extra dividend: Unleash the school that supports "dialogue and friendship" with the Syrian regime in Washington to advance its arguments in this regard.
A question has been fusing in the media about Zawahiri's calls for the Levant Jihadists, including the Jund al Sham to attack targets in Syria and Lebanon . Are these video messages coordinated with Syria and Iran . While no evidence is surfacing yet, but these are two Jihadi wars taking place against the US and its allies at the same time. In the midst of an Al Qaeda war and of a Khumeinist-Baathist campaign, both directed against democracies in the region, overlapping actions aren't impossible. Otherwise, how to explain that al Qaeda waited so long before it issued a direct Jihad-guideline on Lebanon and Syria after 14 years of war on the US and three years war in Iraq ? Why would the no 2 of al Qaeda suddenly develop an interest in the Lebanese-Syrian battlefield, immediately after the cease fire was concluded between Hezbollah and Israel ? Who needed whom to begin the next stage in troubles after the issuing of UNSCR 1701?
Let's call it the quiz of the month: you'd find your answer in Machiavelli's writings.
Dr Walid Phares is a Senior Fellow and the director of Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies
Syria: The poorly executed attack
Global Intelligence, Stratfor, September 13, 2006
A covered pickup truck loaded with poorly constructed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) remained intact Sept. 12 after the smoke cleared from a gunbattle between Syrian security forces and at least four attackers outside the U.S. Embassy in Damascus , Syria . Three of the attackers and a Syrian security guard died in the fighting, while a fourth attacker and about 14 other people were injured. No U.S. citizens were among the casualties. At first glance, the incident appears to have been a jihadist attack against the embassy, though if that is the case the perpetrators quite obviously failed to adequately plan and execute the operation.
Not only were the IEDs poorly constructed -- meaning they probably lacked sufficient power to even breach the embassy compound's perimeter wall, let alone damage the interior of the compound -- the attacking force also was completely inadequate for hitting a hard target such as the embassy. The compound is surrounded by Syrian security forces, and guarded on the inside by U.S. Marines. Although small details suggest the embassy was the target, it is hard to believe such an attack would have been so botched.
An analysis of the preliminary details of the attack suggests the Syrian response was swift and aggressive. Plainclothes Syrian security officers appear to have engaged the attackers before they were able to position themselves for the attack. As the shooting began, some of the attackers reportedly ran into a nearby building and continued firing from there. At least two of the attackers reportedly were seen running toward the embassy, firing automatic rifles and throwing at least one grenade. The fighting lasted for 15 minutes to about half an hour, according to different witnesses.
The U.S. Embassy is located in Damascus ' Rawda district, an area that also houses many other foreign embassies and Syrian government buildings, as well as palaces used by Syrian President Bashar al Assad. One of these palaces is within 980 feet of the U.S. Embassy, which is partly the reason for the tight security in the area. Because of the number of high-value targets in the area, however, only a serious investigation into the attack would reveal the true target -- and U.S. investigators probably are not going to be allowed close to this one.
Due to the tension between Washington and Damascus , the degree of Syrian surveillance around the U.S. Embassy in Damascus is equal to that which was in place outside the U.S. Embassy in Moscow during the Cold War. In addition to the approximately 30 Syrian guards posted around the embassy on any given day, the compound is under constant and heavy surveillance by Syrian intelligence and security forces. This surveillance begins several blocks out, and all locals in the vicinity are watched by the Syrians as possible U.S. intelligence sources. Anyone acting suspiciously near the embassy immediately attracts the attention of Syrian security forces.
The high level of security in the district, and in Damascus in general, might have prevented the militants from conducting adequate pre-operational surveillance, which would go a long way toward explaining the poor planning and execution of the attack. It would also explain the rapid Syrian response. The attackers used two vehicles: a pickup truck topped with a hard camper/cargo shell and rigged with multiple IEDs, and a Mitsubishi Lancer car, possibly ferrying one of the assault teams. After the attack, the truck remained parked against the embassy perimeter. If it was purposely positioned there, it could have been meant to detonate and breach the wall, allowing an assault team to enter the embassy grounds, possibly with the goal of killing U.S. diplomatic personnel. This tactic is not unprecedented, as the December 2004 attack against the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah , Saudi Arabia , demonstrates.
The IEDs in the truck appear to have been made locally from propane tanks, each with three pipe bombs taped around them. Propane tanks are used extensively in the Middle East , so a purchase of several tanks would not arouse the suspicions of Syrian security forces. The construction of the IEDs, however, suggests they would not have been effective, even had they exploded. In the first place, the three pipe bombs on each tank would have had to detonate simultaneously to ignite the gas and increase the power of the explosion. Then, all of the IEDs would have to detonate simultaneously -- a more difficult task than it would seem. Finally, even had the gas in the cylinders ignited, the damage probably would have been limited. The lack of effective IEDs and proficiency in their construction suggests the IEDs were not smuggled in from Iraq , and that attackers probably were not linked to al Qaeda in Iraq .
The more-powerful, military-grade explosives easily found in Iraq and used by insurgents to construct IEDs there would have been much more effective than the propane tank and pipe bomb IEDs found at the scene. In addition, Iraq-based insurgents have refined IED construction to an art, while the bombmaker in this attack seems to have been less than proficient.
Witnesses reported that the attackers did detonate an IED inside the Lancer, although photographs taken of the car following the attack indicate the car burned, but did not explode. Even a small pipe bomb inside a vehicle causes more damage than what is evidenced in the photo of the Lancer. Instead, then, the car might have been set ablaze by Syrian security forces' return fire. The truck bomb also failed to detonate, either because it malfunctioned or the person assigned with detonating it was unable to do so.
Although these particular attackers planned poorly regardless of their true target, the U.S. Embassy in Damascus is a vulnerable target. In the first place, the embassy is not an Inman design, a building constructed to include security features recommended by a commission chaired by former Deputy CIA Director Adm. Bobby Inman following the 1983 attacks in Beirut , Lebanon . These features include few windows, anti-vehicle barriers and long standoff distances to the building. Occupying a corner of al Mansour and Atal Ayyoubi streets, the wedge-shaped compound is bordered on two sides by public streets. Like embassies in other diplomatic quarters of old cities, the streets come right up to the compound's walls, meaning there is very little standoff distance -- certainly not as much as recommended by the Inman Commission, and much less than is required for new embassy buildings. In addition, nearby buildings are taller and overlook the embassy, with a view right down into the courtyard.
The incident bears similarities to one in April 2004, when Syrian security forces surprised a car full of gunmen in front of the Canadian Embassy in Damascus . The car was rigged with an IED, possibly for use in an attack against a target other than the Canadian Embassy. The target of that attack remains unclear.
Although the Syrian government has pledged full cooperation with the United States , it is unlikely that Damascus will give U.S. investigators much access to the details of the case. After the 2004 incident, the Syrians refused to allow U.S. investigators into the country, preferring to control all aspects of the investigation themselves. Although the type of operation suggests this was a jihadist effort, should Damascus block Washington from participating in the investigation, the real motive behind the attack will unlikely be revealed any time soon
By Walid Phares
September 13, 2006
According to well informed Syrian sources, today's Terrorist attack against the US embassy in Damascus is one of the "Machiavellian" Assad operations. Let's remind ourselves that the Syrian regime's senior strategists and intelligence officers were trained by the sophisticated "intox" schools of the former Soviet's KGB. One of the main tactics of this old school, refined by Hafez Assad during his rule of Syria is based on the following concept: If the equation is to your disadvantage, create a new problem, offer to solve it, obtain recognition; and by that you'd change the equation.
The strategic objective of the Assad regime today is to deter Washington from further pressures against Syria , in the form of the Hariri investigation, the US pressure through the Security Council to deploy forces along the borders with Lebanon and the American ongoing support to the anti-Syrian Government in Beirut . Tehran-Damascus-Hezbollah axis is in dire need to "contain" Washington 's pressures and gain time, as much possible of time. Why would they need time? Because they have to rearm Hezbollah, crumble the Lebanese Government, and face off with UN pressures on the nuclear. Syria has the marching orders to disorient the United States , and hence it adopted a twin approach:
a. "Allow" a Jihadist-type terror attack to take place against a US interest in Damascus . And how can that be possible? The seasoned experts on Syria knows all too well that the Assad Mukhabarat are in control of, or have "access" to the overwhelming Terrorist organizations in Syria and Lebanon. They've had thirty years of deep involvement to accomplish this take over. In addition to Shiia Hezbollah , Syria has a control, a remote-control of, or an access to Sunni Salafists groups, including networks that connects with al Qaeda. In short, Syria 's intelligence services can prepare the ground to "persuade" Jihadists to strike at some point. The Jihadists have an ideological and strategic enmity with the US ; the Assad regime has the ability to have the "mob" unleash attacks, in the same way the Baath regime of Syria has "allowed" thousands of Jihadists to cross the border to Iraq to kill US and coalition troops. Assad the father also "allowed" Jihadis to attack U.S and French interests in Lebanon during the 1980s. More recently, Assad "allowed' violent demonstrations to attack embassies in Damascus . Knowing that Syria 's State police controls the country with an iron hand, these precedents are too bright to ignore. In today's apparatus two men dominate the Terror web from their security intelligence positions: Mohammed Nassif, the director of State Security and Ali Yunis, the assistant of Asaf Shawkat, the regime's security commander. Nassif and Yunis are the team that controls and connects with the Jihadist underworld in the Levant .
b. Stage the "protection" : After the operation happens, the regime allows some of their men to be killed in action against the "Terrorists." Obviously, this move will be hard to absorb by Western and American public psychologically. Maybe Hollywood movies writers can. In short (as an analytical projection) the regime "allowed" the operation to happen, "knew" it would happen, and let the security guards on the ground sacrifice themselves in the line of diplomatic duty.
The Dividends:
1. Sending a message to the U.S as follow: al Qaeda can strike you in our midst ( Syria and Lebanon ) and we can't do much about, except the classical protection once the "cells" would be about to engage or have already engaged. In short we are extending the measures under international laws, not more.
2. "But, can stop them." Meaning that our "powerful" intelligence and security agencies can go after these Terrorists (who aren't Syria's friends to start with) and "offer them to you," as we used to do in the good old days: We'd send Hezbollah to kill your Marines in Lebanon and allow the Salafists to kill the Marines again in Iraq, but at the same time we can do business with you and "protect your" embassies from the Terrorists we are harboring anyway. Yes a good Levantine maze.
3. Your public, via international media, "saw" that we are defending your embassy and have "lost" security guards while defending it. So what are you going to tell your public? That we, the Syrian regime, "are" the terrorists? It will look bad when after we sacrificed our men for your diplomats, your diplomats would call us Terrorists.
4. Secretary Rice "had" to issue a statement to "thanking" Syria . In Assad's mind, it would be an embarrassment for the U.S to attack Syria for being a harbor to Terrorism when Damascus has just being thanked for fighting those Terrorists. This, basically, would gain some more "time" for Assad. Enough time needed to:
5. Rearm Hezbollah, prepare attacks against UN and other multinational forces to come closer to the Syrian borders, and of course to allow the other pressures to recede.
6. Extra dividend: Unleash the school that supports "dialogue and friendship" with the Syrian regime in Washington to advance its arguments in this regard.
A question has been fusing in the media about Zawahiri's calls for the Levant Jihadists, including the Jund al Sham to attack targets in Syria and Lebanon . Are these video messages coordinated with Syria and Iran . While no evidence is surfacing yet, but these are two Jihadi wars taking place against the US and its allies at the same time. In the midst of an Al Qaeda war and of a Khumeinist-Baathist campaign, both directed against democracies in the region, overlapping actions aren't impossible. Otherwise, how to explain that al Qaeda waited so long before it issued a direct Jihad-guideline on Lebanon and Syria after 14 years of war on the US and three years war in Iraq ? Why would the no 2 of al Qaeda suddenly develop an interest in the Lebanese-Syrian battlefield, immediately after the cease fire was concluded between Hezbollah and Israel ? Who needed whom to begin the next stage in troubles after the issuing of UNSCR 1701?
Let's call it the quiz of the month: you'd find your answer in Machiavelli's writings.
Dr Walid Phares is a Senior Fellow and the director of Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies
Syria: The poorly executed attack
Global Intelligence, Stratfor, September 13, 2006
A covered pickup truck loaded with poorly constructed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) remained intact Sept. 12 after the smoke cleared from a gunbattle between Syrian security forces and at least four attackers outside the U.S. Embassy in Damascus , Syria . Three of the attackers and a Syrian security guard died in the fighting, while a fourth attacker and about 14 other people were injured. No U.S. citizens were among the casualties. At first glance, the incident appears to have been a jihadist attack against the embassy, though if that is the case the perpetrators quite obviously failed to adequately plan and execute the operation.
Not only were the IEDs poorly constructed -- meaning they probably lacked sufficient power to even breach the embassy compound's perimeter wall, let alone damage the interior of the compound -- the attacking force also was completely inadequate for hitting a hard target such as the embassy. The compound is surrounded by Syrian security forces, and guarded on the inside by U.S. Marines. Although small details suggest the embassy was the target, it is hard to believe such an attack would have been so botched.
An analysis of the preliminary details of the attack suggests the Syrian response was swift and aggressive. Plainclothes Syrian security officers appear to have engaged the attackers before they were able to position themselves for the attack. As the shooting began, some of the attackers reportedly ran into a nearby building and continued firing from there. At least two of the attackers reportedly were seen running toward the embassy, firing automatic rifles and throwing at least one grenade. The fighting lasted for 15 minutes to about half an hour, according to different witnesses.
The U.S. Embassy is located in Damascus ' Rawda district, an area that also houses many other foreign embassies and Syrian government buildings, as well as palaces used by Syrian President Bashar al Assad. One of these palaces is within 980 feet of the U.S. Embassy, which is partly the reason for the tight security in the area. Because of the number of high-value targets in the area, however, only a serious investigation into the attack would reveal the true target -- and U.S. investigators probably are not going to be allowed close to this one.
Due to the tension between Washington and Damascus , the degree of Syrian surveillance around the U.S. Embassy in Damascus is equal to that which was in place outside the U.S. Embassy in Moscow during the Cold War. In addition to the approximately 30 Syrian guards posted around the embassy on any given day, the compound is under constant and heavy surveillance by Syrian intelligence and security forces. This surveillance begins several blocks out, and all locals in the vicinity are watched by the Syrians as possible U.S. intelligence sources. Anyone acting suspiciously near the embassy immediately attracts the attention of Syrian security forces.
The high level of security in the district, and in Damascus in general, might have prevented the militants from conducting adequate pre-operational surveillance, which would go a long way toward explaining the poor planning and execution of the attack. It would also explain the rapid Syrian response. The attackers used two vehicles: a pickup truck topped with a hard camper/cargo shell and rigged with multiple IEDs, and a Mitsubishi Lancer car, possibly ferrying one of the assault teams. After the attack, the truck remained parked against the embassy perimeter. If it was purposely positioned there, it could have been meant to detonate and breach the wall, allowing an assault team to enter the embassy grounds, possibly with the goal of killing U.S. diplomatic personnel. This tactic is not unprecedented, as the December 2004 attack against the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah , Saudi Arabia , demonstrates.
The IEDs in the truck appear to have been made locally from propane tanks, each with three pipe bombs taped around them. Propane tanks are used extensively in the Middle East , so a purchase of several tanks would not arouse the suspicions of Syrian security forces. The construction of the IEDs, however, suggests they would not have been effective, even had they exploded. In the first place, the three pipe bombs on each tank would have had to detonate simultaneously to ignite the gas and increase the power of the explosion. Then, all of the IEDs would have to detonate simultaneously -- a more difficult task than it would seem. Finally, even had the gas in the cylinders ignited, the damage probably would have been limited. The lack of effective IEDs and proficiency in their construction suggests the IEDs were not smuggled in from Iraq , and that attackers probably were not linked to al Qaeda in Iraq .
The more-powerful, military-grade explosives easily found in Iraq and used by insurgents to construct IEDs there would have been much more effective than the propane tank and pipe bomb IEDs found at the scene. In addition, Iraq-based insurgents have refined IED construction to an art, while the bombmaker in this attack seems to have been less than proficient.
Witnesses reported that the attackers did detonate an IED inside the Lancer, although photographs taken of the car following the attack indicate the car burned, but did not explode. Even a small pipe bomb inside a vehicle causes more damage than what is evidenced in the photo of the Lancer. Instead, then, the car might have been set ablaze by Syrian security forces' return fire. The truck bomb also failed to detonate, either because it malfunctioned or the person assigned with detonating it was unable to do so.
Although these particular attackers planned poorly regardless of their true target, the U.S. Embassy in Damascus is a vulnerable target. In the first place, the embassy is not an Inman design, a building constructed to include security features recommended by a commission chaired by former Deputy CIA Director Adm. Bobby Inman following the 1983 attacks in Beirut , Lebanon . These features include few windows, anti-vehicle barriers and long standoff distances to the building. Occupying a corner of al Mansour and Atal Ayyoubi streets, the wedge-shaped compound is bordered on two sides by public streets. Like embassies in other diplomatic quarters of old cities, the streets come right up to the compound's walls, meaning there is very little standoff distance -- certainly not as much as recommended by the Inman Commission, and much less than is required for new embassy buildings. In addition, nearby buildings are taller and overlook the embassy, with a view right down into the courtyard.
The incident bears similarities to one in April 2004, when Syrian security forces surprised a car full of gunmen in front of the Canadian Embassy in Damascus . The car was rigged with an IED, possibly for use in an attack against a target other than the Canadian Embassy. The target of that attack remains unclear.
Although the Syrian government has pledged full cooperation with the United States , it is unlikely that Damascus will give U.S. investigators much access to the details of the case. After the 2004 incident, the Syrians refused to allow U.S. investigators into the country, preferring to control all aspects of the investigation themselves. Although the type of operation suggests this was a jihadist effort, should Damascus block Washington from participating in the investigation, the real motive behind the attack will unlikely be revealed any time soon